In this article, we look at some of the challenges that accompany the conceptual and practical stress on the "appropriateness" of care. Al though these challenges may extend over the range of health services, we have (following the historical attention to unnecessary surgery) limited our discussion to decision-making for surgical interventions. In particu lar, we focus on the evaluative nature of the concept of appropriateness and propose a framework for distinguishing between three sources of value that give meaning to this concept in patient care. The first is the clinical p o in t o f view. We argue that clinical recommendations demand a broader and more substantial evidentiary basis and that this informa tion should be an integral part of the informed consent process. The sec ond is the p o in t o f view o f th e in d ivid u a l p a tie n t in determining an intervention's "desirability." The third is the societal p o in t o f view, where appropriateness is understood in terms of the "cost-worthiness" of possible outcomes. This framework is also used to shed light on the con tentious issue of medical futility.
The RAND Health Services Utilization Study
In the pioneering RAND studies, a procedure or intervention is desig nated "appropriate" when the "expected health benefit (i.e., increased life expectancy, relief of pain, reduction of anxiety, improved functional capacity) exceed[s] the expected negative consequences (i.e., mortality, morbidity, anxiety of anticipating the procedure, pain produced by the procedure, time lost from work) by a sufficiently wide margin that the procedure [is] worth doing" (Park et al. 1986 ).
On the basis of this definition and a detailed methodology for the de velopment of recommendations by consensus, RAND researchers have, over the last decade, conducted numerous studies on the appropriateness of interventions like coronary angiography, gastrointestinal endoscopy, carotid endarterectomy, coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), percutane ous transluminal angioplasty (PTCA), and hysterectomy. On average, the performance of these procedures was rated appropriate in only 63 per cent of cases (see table 1 ).
One of the purposes of the Health Services Utilization Study was to investigate the phenomenon of geographic variations in the use of surgi cal services. In a landmark study of 13 Vermont hospital service areas, for example, Wennberg and Gittelsohn (1973) found that the number of procedures performed per 10,000 persons ranged from 13 to 151 for ton sillectomy, 10 to 32 for appendectomy, and 30 to 141 for dilation and curettage. RAND set out to test the generally held view that dispropor tionately high rates of use were indicative of unnecessary surgery. Their results, however, showed no such correlation (Chassin et al. 1987a ). In fact, in the RAND studies, rates of inappropriateness ranged between 4 percent and 32 percent and were consistent over b o th high-and lowuse areas (Chassin et al. 1987a) . The most compelling explanation that has emerged for the phenomenon of geographic variation is professional uncertainty regarding the value of a procedure and the indications for its use (Wennberg, Barnes, and Zubkoff 1982; Eddy 1984) . Widespread ac ceptance of this theory has produced a number of strategies to explicitly determine indications for the appropriate use of medical and surgical in terventions. This is the mandate of the U.S. Agency for Health Care Pol icy and Research (Marwick 1993 ) and the catalyst for specialty society development of practice guidelines.
The RAND experience offers important insight into the challenges that accompany the conceptual and practical stress on the appropriate- ness rather than the inappropriateness of care. One very significant chal lenge lies in the choice of methodology (and, therefore, of evidence) that is used to assess appropriateness and to ground clinical recommen dations. The RAND research uses a modified Delphi form of consensus methodology: a procedure is deemed appropriate (its anticipated ben efits for a particular patient scenario exceed its anticipated harms) if it was judged by a nine-member panel of physician experts to be within a specified median range with no more than two physicians rating the pro cedure as inappropriate. Although panelists' evaluations were based in part on a synthesis of the relevant literature, only 10 percent of the avail able studies on coronary angiography, gastrointestinal endoscopy, carotid endarterectomy, and CABG were based on randomized controlled clini cal trials (RCTs). Moreover, according to the RAND researchers, they made "no attem p t. . . to score the quality of journals, articles, or [article] contents" that formed the empirical basis for their recommendations (Fink et al. 1987) . A weakness of the RAND method, therefore, is that it is not based on an explicit link between recommendations and the quality of supporting evidence (Woolf 1992) . Despite its more formal approach to consensus development, this method is also perceived to be limited by its fundamental reliance on opinion. On this point, advocates of the RCT as the proper method for determinations of appropriateness suggest that expert opinion may often be inaccurate and thus compro mise initiation of needed controlled clinical trials. Richard Peto, a critic of the RAND methodology, has suggested that RAND consensus recom mendations against the efficacy of carotid endarterectomy "had a major chilling effect" on efforts to determine the procedure's efficacy through an RCT (cited in Cotton 1993) . The RCT also has its shortcomings, however, as a method for deter mining appropriateness. RCTs do not provide evidence for a procedure's effectiveness (the level of benefit achievable under ordinary clinical condi tions), but, rather, for its possible efficacy (the level of benefit achievable under ideal clinical conditions). RCTs are often extremely expensive, and their results may not be available for years. Moreover, many RCTs use a narrow range of outcomes measures and ignore quality-of-life and other health status variables that are relevant in health care decision making (Guadagnoli and McNeil 1994) . In addition, there are ethical challenges to randomization itself.
The RAND-modified Delphi approach and randomized trials repre sent only two in a growing number of sophisticated methods proposed to assess clinical appropriateness. The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) PORT studies, for example, provide a hybrid, evi dence-based approach that also accounts for expert assessments. Meta analysis is a method for analyzing a range of evidence from across multiple studies. The types and quality of evidence required to establish appropri ateness are the subjects of ongoing debate. As Eddy (1993) has pointed out, the resolution of these important methodological questions will establish a standard for determining what works in medical practice, and this, in turn, will have an enormous influence not only on the reimbursement decisions of third-party payers, but also on the approval process for research protocols that seek a determination of efficacy through an RCT. In the next section we look at a number of proposals that have been offered on the evaluation and ranking of evidence.
A second challenge that accompanies the stress on appropriateness of care is the medical profession's historical tendency to view appropriate ness in strictly clinical terms. This perspective is illustrated and advo cated in a letter to the editor of the N ew E n g la n d Jo u rn a l o f M edicine. "The patient's attitude," the author says, "should have no influence on what the physician advises as appropriate therapy for the patient's ill ness. The... risks to benefit ratio, as stated by the physician, should be the only consideration when making a therapeutic decision" (Wortsman 1979) . Incongruities between patient and physician perceptions of ap propriateness, however, have been demonstrated in a number of studies. In a comparison of risk preferences regarding prostatectomy, for exam ple, Barry and colleagues (1988) have shown that patients presented with an analysis of risks and benefits tend to decide in favor of the procedure less often than their physicians. Similar differences have been observed in physician and patient perceptions of the appropriateness of laryngec tomy as a treatment for throat cancer (McNeil, Weichselbaum, and Pauker 1980) . These findings point to the fact that the concept of appropriateness is fundamentally evaluative. It is variously informed by the norms and val ues of science, of medicine, of individuals, and of society. Determina tions of the appropriateness of a procedure therefore should not be regarded simply, or even primarily, as an evidentiary problem (since evi dentiary issues are themselves value laden), but rather as a problem of values assessment. Appropriateness research has become increasingly at tentive to this fact and has expanded its decision models to include not only clinical values (such as changes in physiological function) but pa 
Clinical Assessment: Correlating Evidence and Efficacy
In the context of patient care, the recommendation of a procedure is based on at least four interrelated clinical factors: (1) the patient's clini cal profile; (2) the physician's (and team 's) skill; (3) the quality of the evidence supporting a procedure; and (4) the procedure's clinical ben efit/harm ratio, understood in terms of the empirical evidence that is available on the intervention's clinical efficacy and effectiveness. We use the term "benefit" advisedly here, cognizant of the fact that ultimately it is the patient who determines whether a specific clinical effect is, in fact, beneficial -a subject we take up in the section on "desirability" be low. From the physician's point of view, however, the clinical ben efit/harm ratio represents one way of assessing the potential effects of a procedure in terms of such empirical and population-based variables as morbidity, mortality, and quality-of-life indicators. If an intervention is inconsistent with the patient's clinical presentation or if the physician or team is insufficiently skilled to carry out the intervention (e.g., has a high complication rate), then the intervention is de facto inappropriate and should not be recommended.
Evidentiary judgments are understood in terms of degree and thus can be roughly classified as a basis for clinical recommendations. Proposed rules of evidence for such classifications have recendy come from a num ber of quarters. As reported by Sackett (1989) This classificatory framework parallels the one put forward by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force in its evaluation of the effectiveness of clinical preventive services (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force 1989)-The task force proposed a hierarchical ranking of evidentiary quality that gave greater weight to study designs whose methodology made them less subject to bias and inferential error. In descending order, they are welldesigned RCTs followed by nonrandomized controlled trials, cohort studies, case control studies, comparisons between time and place, un controlled experiments, and, finally, descriptive studies and expert opin ion. Using this hierarchy, recommendations were graded on a five-point scale.
In what follows we provide a framework for correlating evidence and efficacy as a basis for clinical recommendations and informed consent. Our hierarchical ranking of evidence is similar to the rankings discussed above. In addition, we use this framework to suggest terminological dis tinctions that can be used in place of the ambiguous terms "appropriate" and "necessary," which, for the purposes of this article, we regard as synonomous (Kahan et al. 1994) .
The possibly b en eficia l intervention is one thought to be preponder antly beneficial, but only on the basis either of evidence provided largely by case reports or of uncontrolled clinical impressions or uncontrolled studies. In other words, such inferences about the benefit of an interven tion are rationally plausible but have only been subjected to the weakest empirical scrutiny. An example would be radical prostatectomy for well-differentiated, localized prostate cancer in patients less than 75 years old (Fleming et al. 1993) . Cases where uncontrolled studies provide the evidence for an intervention's efficacy include photorefractive kera tectomy as a surgical treatment for myopia (Gartry, Kerr, and Marshall 1992; Salz et al. 1993) and CABG in asymptomatic patients or patients with ischemia or mild angina/ischemia with three-vessel disease, no se vere left anterior descending (LAD) stenosis, and normal left ventricular (LV) function (American College of Cardiology /American Heart Associ ation 1991). It should be made clear to the patient that procedures in this category are based on the weakest empirical support.
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In d ica ted and highly in d ica ted interventions are supported by propor tionally superior empirical evidence as to their benefit. The evidence supporting an indicated intervention should be derived from at least one randomized, controlled clinical trial, from a broad meta-analysis of sound studies (L'Abbe, Detsky, and O 'Rourke 1987), or from a systematic con sensus methodology or outcomes review like the PORT projects described above (Clinton 1991 ). An example would be conventional lumbar lami nectomy/discectomy for patients with uncomplicated herniated discs (DATTA Report 1990 Weber 1983) .
The highly in d ica ted procedure is one whose benefit has been un equivocally established through either definitive or replicated RCTs. Ad ditionally, the highly indicated intervention is one whose expected benefits have been clearly shown to exceed the anticipated benefits of al ternative therapies. Examples include carotid endarterectomy for pa tients with transient ischemic attacks (TIAs) and greater than 70 percent stenosis (North American Symptomatic Carotid Endarterectomy Trial Collaborates [NASCET] 1991; Mayberg et al. 1991) or CABG for pa tients with left main artery disease and chronic, stable class III angina (American College of Cardiology/A H A... 1991)-Just as the evidence regarding efficacy and effectiveness reveals the rel ative benefits of an intervention, so too does it reveal the relative harms. Accordingly, we recommend replacing the overly broad terms inappro priate and unnecessary with the more specific designations described be low. Like the previous distinctions regarding benefit, these terms have as their primary reference point the degree of empirical evidence substanti ating a procedure's benefit/harm ratio. Again, these distinctions become relevant only when a procedure is consistent with a patient's clinical pre sentation and when the physician (and team) are adequately skilled. If these conditions are not met, then a procedure is contraindicated regardless of the strength of evidence for its general efficacy. An important excep tion is the performance of procedures by physicians in training. Society allows for supervised intervention by medical students and residents and accepts the attendant risks because the future availability of medical care is viewed as a significant social good. W hether or not these risks are eq uitably distributed remains an important question for public policy.
W hen a procedure is thought to be preponderantly harmful based only on anecdotal evidence, case reports, or uncontrolled studies, the procedure should be termed po ssib ly harm ful. Examples would include lumbar fusion for back pain (Turner et al. 1992; Franklin et al. 1994) and decalcification for degenerative aortic stenosis (Freeman et al. 1990 ).
These lower levels of evidence also support the equivocal intervention: one whose ratio of benefit to harm is roughly equal. An equivocal desig nation indicates, above all, the need for more study on the particular in tervention and its clinical uses. Examples include carotid endarterectomy for TIAs and 30 to 70 percent stenosis (NASCET 1991; European Ca rotid Surgery Trialists' Collaborative Group [ECST] 1991) or for asymp tomatic bruit (Barnett and Haines 1993; Bornstein and Norris 1993) .
Important ethical limits on human subjects research prevent the per formance of rigorous trials to prove that a drug or procedure's burdens are indeed disproportionate to its benefits. Thus the evidentiary require ments to establish a procedure as con tra in d ica ted will not be as demand ing as those placed on determinations of care that is indicated or highly indicated. Accordingly, when good evidence from controlled trials, from a broad meta-analysis of studies, or from a systematic consensus method ology or outcomes review reveals that the harms outweigh the benefits of a procedure, that procedure should be termed "contraindicated." Exam ples of contraindicated procedures are extracranial-intracranial bypass for stroke prevention (Barnett et al. 1985) , CABG in patients with mild stable angina and single-vessel disease (American College of Cardiol ogy/AHA 1991), radical prostatectomy for well-differentiated localized cancer in patients older than 75 years (Lu-Yao et al. 1993; Wennberg et al. 1988) , and carotid endarterectomy in patients with TIAs and less than 30 percent stenosis (ECST 1991). W hen superior evidence has es tablished that the possibility of benefit and harm from an intervention is roughly equivalent-that is, when there is clearly no favorable ben efit/harm ratio-that intervention should be classed as nonindicated. Figure 1 represents the distinctions just described as they appear along the spectrum of evidence and the spectrum of benefit and harm that can be associated with a procedure. As represented by the vertical axis, evi dence may be weak or strong depending on study methodology and scope. As represented by the horizontal axis, the efficacy (and/or effective ness) of an intervention may extend from clearly preponderant benefit to clearly preponderant harm. Although this axis represents only magnitudes of benefit and harm, probability assessments are also relevant to the judg ment process. The probabilities of benefit and harm are data that should be elicited from the available evidence and transmitted to the patient in the informed consent process (McNeil et al. 1982; Eddy 1990b) .
The shaded area in the figure encompasses interventions that, because of insufficient evidence, should be identified as unproven. When any such intervention is contemplated, the fact that it is unproven should be made clear to the patient in the informed consent process. Ideally, inter ventions of unproved benefit should be undertaken, when ethically per missible, only within the context of a research protocol. Figure 2 is a sample plotting of the interventions described above. The classifications represented in Figure 1 provide a degree of specific ity not captured by the broad terms "medically necessary" or "clinically appropriate." As such, they can provide a coherent and meaningful vo cabulary for medical practitioners and patients as they deliberate on the right course of treatment. These classifications can also serve as a useful analytic framework for practice guidelines. Specialty societies might, for example, use this figure as a model to identify, in an ongoing way, the correlation between evidence and the benefit/harm ratio for the inter- ventions particular to their specialties. This information would ideally be supplemented by broader outcomes data on the comparative efficacy and effectiveness of alternative treatments. Further, as evolving in formed consent law recognizes their availability, these data will also in creasingly be regarded as material information that m u st be disclosed to patients (Hatlie 1993) .
In the following sections we discuss two different ways in which pa tient considerations should inform determinations about the legitimacy of an intervention. In the context of outcomes research, data about the average patient should be incorporated into patient-centered outcomes measures. In the therapeutic context, considerations of the in d ivid u a l patient should determine the desirability of an intervention.
Efficacy, Effectiveness, and Patient-Centered Outcomes Measures
Because clinical trials are considered the optimal source of information for medical decision-making, the measures used within these trials to determine a procedure's efficacy and effectiveness must be as broad as possible and should include well-standardized, patient-centered qualityof-life and health status measures like anxiety, impact on role and social function, recuperation time, and days lost from work (Brook 1989; Tarlov et al. 1989; Tarlov 1992) . To date, as Geigle, Brook, and others point out, the narrow focus on mortality and morbidity or change in a physiological variable, with its attendant omission of quality-of-life mea sures, has left the patient largely on the periphery of most outcomes as sessment and outcome-oriented quality measurement (Geigle and Jones 1990; Brook and Kamberg 1987; Lehr and Strosberg 1991) . By incorpo rating patient-centered health status measures in their overall assessment of efficacy and effectiveness, recent studies have been able to provide a more comprehensive range of relevant information as the basis for in formed health care decision-making (McNeil, Weichselbaum, and Pauker 1981; Ware et al. 1981; Lohr 1988; Hollenberg et al. 1991) .
Assessments of the quality of evidence supporting a procedure will be based on the degree to which they have included a broad array of clinical and patient-centered outcomes measures such as survival rate, states of physical, emotional, and social health, quality of well-being, and pa tient satisfaction. In the best-case scenario, all of this information would be available to individual patients and physicians in the clinical setting and would provide a comprehensive basis for informed consent or re fusal. In other words, the more that technology and therapeutic assess ment includes patient-centered considerations, the more relevant the data on efficacy and effectiveness will be to actual patients. Eddy has suggested that a distinction be made between such "intermediate out comes" as test results or biological or physiological indicators and the ultimate "health outcomes" of a procedure. He argues that health out comes-effects that patients experience and care about like pain, anxi ety, death, disfigurement, and disability-should be the primary focus of informed medical decision-making (Eddy 1990a) . W hen interventions have as one of their main purposes the improvement of quality of life, the "appropriateness" or "necessity" of a treatment cannot be rigidly de fined according to non-patient-centered criteria (Barry et al. 1988 ).
Empirical information is only one component in the determination of an intervention's legitimacy. A further element is the intervention's d e sirability as judged by the informed patient.
The Patient's Perspective and the Desirability o f Care
It is generally accepted that the appropriateness or necessity of an inter vention is to be understood in terms of potential benefits and harms that it offers to the patient. Given this, the notion of appropriateness or ne cessity must take into account not only the clinical benefits and harmsunderstood both narrowly in terms of morbidity and mortality and more broadly in terms of overall quality of life for the "average " patient-but also the relevance of clinical and "nonclinical" benefits and harms for the in d ivid u a l p a tie n t in the context of medical decision-making. This includes individual quality-of-life decisions and individual assessments of acceptable risk and cost. O f course, as outcomes measures become more patient centered, the notion of a "clinical" benefit will be corre spondingly enlarged. Nevertheless, in the context of care, an individual patient's values, risk preferences, and financial and social circumstances introduce considerations that are essential to the decision-making process and that cannot be captured by aggregate data about health outcomes. In short, it is the in d iv id u a l p a tie n t who determines the ultimate desir ability of an intervention for him-or herself. For instance, although a surgery might be regarded as highly indicated from the point of view of relative medical risks and benefits, it might also be regarded as undesir able by a patient who either is risk averse or rejects anticipated medical benefit in favor of other, more highly valued goals (Pauly 1979; McNeil, Weichselbaum, and Pauker 1978; Danis et al. 1988) . Albert Einstein, for example, refused surgery for an aortic aneurysm (which ultimately killed him) because he was committed to a life based on simplicity. He judged the recommended surgery as undesirable because increased lon gevity was, in his view, outweighed by the inconvenience of the inter vention (Gary A. Chase: personal communication, December 12, 1994) . Another example of an intervention that could be deemed indicated yet undesirable is a laryngectomy for a throat cancer patient who is willing to opt for quality of life over survival because she values the continued use of her voice over longevity without normal speech (McNeil, Weichselbaum, and Pauker 1981) .
In order to honor the values that the in d iv id u a l p a tie n t brings to the decision-making process, we recommend that an intervention be termed desirable if it is freely accepted by the informed patient or valid surrogate.
Interpreting Appropriateness and Futility in the Clinical Context: Some Ethical Considerations

Avoiding Conflict through the Process o f Inform ed Consent /Refusal
The distinctions we have made between a procedure's clinical merit and its desirability to the patient are an attempt to make explicit the fact that the broad terms "necessary" and "appropriate" by definition imply the endorsement of some goal. The same is true for the concept of futility, a notion that has gained wide currency in recent medical literature (Pellegrino 1993) . "Necessary for what and whom?"; "appropriate to what and whose end?"; "futile in the achievement of what and whose therapeutic aim ? " are questions that must be answered if the terms are to be made meaningful (Truog, Brett, and Frader 1992; Youngner 1990) . The informed consent process should involve, therefore, a broad discussion of the therapeutic goals that may differently motivate patients and phy sicians and lead them to diverse interpretations of the "necessity," "ap propriateness," and "futility" of different interventions. The explicit and ongoing identification of the goals of therapy not only facilitates under standing and collaboration in the patient-physician relationship but also lessens the likelihood of conflicting assumptions about care. As expli cated in a Yale-New Haven Hospital policy on do-not-resuscitate deci sions (Committee on Policy... 1983), patient care may have as its goal (1) the achievement of cure or remission; (2) the maintenance of biological function; or (3) the maximization of comfort. Typically, in the routine practice of medicine, it is tacitly understood that the objectives of cure or remission are primary. Even here, however, explicit discussion is neces sary to clarify the risks that the patient is willing to accept in the achieve ment of possible benefit. When, because of advanced illness, the goal of cure is unattainable, the "appropriateness" and desirability of various in terventions will need to be reexamined in light of the newly understood objectives of care (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 1995) .
A key ingredient of the process of informed consent is a discussion be tween physician and patient of both the relative benefits and harms of different treatment options and the quality of evidence that supports these judgments. Insofar as it allows the rough location of a procedure within the related spectra of evidence and benefits and harms, figure 1 can serve as a useful tool in the decision-making process. Recent techno logical innovations may further enhance the information provided to pa tients. For example, on the basis of evidence that surgeons and patients often interpret the need for surgery differently, one program has supple mented physician-patient discourse with an interactive videodisc (Wennberg et al. 1988; Randall 1993) .
This process of informed consent is the means by which a recom mended intervention becomes meaningful to the patient as "desirable" or "undesirable." The concept of futility, like the concept of appropri ateness, can be variously interpreted by the clinician, the patient, or by cost-containment experts. As a result, comparable clarity is required when making use of this term in the context of health care decision making.
Ethical Guides fo r Conflict Resolution
Cases will at times arise when the informed consent process results in conflict regarding the goals of therapy. In the recent W anglie case,1 for example, a patient's family insisted on the desirability of care that the providers believed to be futile (viz. without clinical benefit). More com monly, in cases concerning the withdrawal and withholding of treat ment, a patient may refuse undesired care that physicians or hospitals deem necessary. Some ethical guidelines are useful when reflecting on conflicts of this sort.
First, based on the fundamental liberty of patients as persons, health care providers have no unilateral right to implement a decision about what they consider necessary or unnecessary in the context of individual patient care. Rather, their legitimate domain is the assessment of clinical efficacy, and the probable effects of alternative modes of therapy versus no therapy, and the discussion of this information and their recommen dations with the patient or a valid surrogate. In the context of nonemer gency care, the physician's authority to perform an intervention derives from the patient's (or surrogate's) consent to a procedure that he or she deems desirable.
Second, the profession of medicine is guided by its moral commitment to avoid harm to patients and to aid them in maintaining or improving their health. On this basis, clinicians have a presumptive obligation not to provide treatments that are unproven or contraindicated. In addition, each physician is a moral agent who cannot be compelled to violate his or her personal moral convictions. For these reasons, a patient's demand for unproven or contraindicated care that he or she deems desirable is not sufficient to impose upon providers an obligation to provide that care.
The Societal Dimension of Appropriateness and Futility
As growing concern over both access to health care and escalating health care costs has made clear, individual and professional aims are not pur sued within a vacuum. They are pursued within the context of health care institutions -hospitals, HMOs, third party insurance -and within the larger societal context where the diverse aims of health care, educa tion, defense, and environmental protection, among other sectors, must compete for limited social resources. In the institutional context, the is sues of appropriateness and futility are embedded within the practices of gatekeeping and utilization review, and they have found their way into new hospital policies on futility (Meyer 1993) . In the larger context of health policy, the societal meanings of appropriateness and futility are manifested in debates about "global budgets," a "decent" minimum level of health care (President's Com m ission... 1992), ' essential" and "nonessential" services (Eddy 1991) , and health care rationing (U.S. Congress 1991; Strosberg et al. 1992) . For better or worse, health care decisions are tied to the marketplace and the wider context of social policy.
It is our task as citizens to determine what goals are and are not worth pursuing given the forces of hum an need and market economics (Pellegrino 1986 ). This determination is fundamentally based on the values we hold rather than on any "facts" that can be supplied to us by scientific investigation. As Truog and colleagues have pointed out, "The decision that certain goals are not worth pursuing in the context of health care is best seen as involving a conflict of values rather than a question of futility" (Truog, Brett, and Frader 1992) . To underscore that point, we would recommend, with Tomlinson and Brody (1990) , that when treatment decisions are based on considerations of social distribution, rationing, or cost containment, the appropriately specific term would be the cost w orthiness of an outcome, an intervention, or a likelihood of success, rather than its necessity or futility. This terminology makes ex plicit the economic values upon which a decision rests. By contrast, the term "futile" should be reserved for those procedures that, from the clin ical point of view, offer no possibility of controlling or reversing the course of illness or improving a patient's desired quality of life. The term "fu tile," in other words, should be used to refer to interventions that are deemed clinically nonbeneficial, independent of financial considerations. As Tomlinson and Brody (1990) observe, in this era of cost containment, providers must maintain a clear distinction between the clinically non beneficial operation and one that is simply judged not cost worthy. Can dor in this regard, at the public and individual level, will strengthen public trust in physicians and provider institutions and will help us to understand the human and economic consequences of our choices and our institutional structures.
As Daniel Callahan (1991) has observed, "Life was easier when we thought medical 'necessity' and 'futility' were scientifically discover able." Knowing now that necessity and futility are not so much discov ered as d ecid ed u p o n on the basis of certain value commitments (of physicians, patients, and citizens), we must turn our attention to the dif ficult task of establishing a public standard that determines the bound aries of what society may offer in the arena of health care. Callahan suggests that such a standard should incorporate at least six elements: "1. medical need defined in some general way 2. the efficacy of available treatments in meeting that need 3. the comparative costs and benefits of those treatments 4. the necessity of setting health care priorities 5. a political process capable of making the combined medical and moral judgments that will unavoidably be encountered along the way 6. the stimulation of public and professional debate on the substan tive content of the moral judgm ents."
Until we have begun to gain some clarity on these issues, we would be wise to refrain from the uncritical use of the ambiguous and often mis leading terms "necessary," "unnecessary," "appropriate," "inappropri ate," and "futile." The use of more specific terminology by providers, patients, and policy makers may prevent mistaken assumptions, enhance the informed consent process, and advance the public discourse.
Unnecessary Surgery-Reprise
The shift in focus from "unnecessary surgery" to "appropriateness re search" is evidence of a new era in the evaluation of health services, one that has brought increased scrutiny of the effectiveness and efficacy of medical and surgical practices. Arnold Reiman (1988) has dubbed this the era of "assessment and accountability." As concerns about cost con tainment provide incentives to cut back on expensive services, it has be come increasingly clear that the problem of u nderuse may surpass overuse or unnecessary treatment as a serious risk to patients. Unlike re search on unnecessary surgery, the focus on appropriateness has the ad vantage of being able to address the quality of patient care in terms of both the «#</<?r-utilization and the <wr-urilization of services. Insofar as "appropriateness research" lays open the issue of unm et health care needs, it may also provide some insight into the goal of universal access to care.
